341 BC

THE THIRD PHILIPPIC

Demosthenes

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Notes and Introduction by Thomas Leland, D.D.
Demosthenes (383-322 BC) - Athenian statesman and the most famous of Greek orators. He was leader of a patriotic party opposing Philip of Macedon.

The Third Philippic (341 BC) - The third in a series of speeches in which Demosthenes attacks Philip of Macedon. Demosthenes urged the Athenians to oppose Philip’s conquests of independent Greek states. Cicero later used the name “Philippic” to label his bitter speeches against Mark Antony; the word has since come to stand for any harsh invective.
INTRODUCTION

To the Third Philippic

THE former oration (The Oration on the State of the Chersonesus) has its effect: for, instead of punishing Diopithes, the Athenians supplied him with money, in order to put him in a condition of continuing his expeditions. In the mean time Philip pursued his Thracian conquests, and made himself master of several places, which, though of little importance in themselves, yet opened him a way to the cities of the Propontis, and, above all, to Byzantium, which he had always intended to annex to his dominions. He at first tried the way of negotiation, in order to gain the Byzantines into the number of his allies; but this proving ineffectual, he resolved to proceed in another manner. He had a party in the city at whose head was the orator Python, that engaged to deliver him up one of the gates: but while he was on his march towards the city the conspiracy was discovered, which immediately determined him to take another route. His sudden countermarch, intended to conceal the crime of Python, really served to confirm it. He was brought to trial; but the credit and the presents of Philip prevailed to save him.

The efforts of the Athenians to support their interests in Euboea, and the power which Philip had acquired there, and which every day increased, had entirely destroyed the tranquillity of this island. The people of Oreum, divided by the Athenian and Macedonian factions, were on the point of breaking out into a civil war, when, under pretence of restoring their peace, Philip sent them a body of a thousand troops, under the command of Hipponicus; which soon determined the superiority to his side. Philistides, a tyrant, who had grown old in factions and public contests, was entrusted with the government of Oreum, which he administered with all possible severity and cruelty to those in the Athenian interest; while the other states of the island were also subjected to other Macedonian governors.

Callias, the Chalcidian, whose inconstancy had made him espouse the interests of Athens, of Thebes, and Macedon, successively, now returned to his engagements with Athens. He sent deputies thither to desire assistance, and to prevail on the Athenians to make some vigorous attempt to regain their power in Euboea.

In the mean time the King of Persia, alarmed by the accounts of Philip’s growing power, made use of all the influence which his gold could gain at Athens to engage the Athenians to act openly against an enemy equally suspected by them both. This circumstance perhaps disposed them to give the greater attention to the following oration.
THE THIRD PHILIPPIC

Produced in the Archonship of Sosigenes, two years after the Second Philippic

THOUGH we have heard a great deal, Athenians! in almost every assembly, of those acts of violence which Philip hath been committing, ever since his treaty, not against ours only, but the other states of Greece; though all (I am confident) are ready to acknowledge, even they who fail in the performance, that we should every one of us exert our efforts, in council and in action, to oppose and to chastise his insolence; yet to such circumstances are you reduced by your supineness that I fear (shocking as it is to say, yet) that, had we all agreed to propose, and you to embrace such measures, as would most effectually ruin our affairs, they could not have been more distressed than at present. And to this, perhaps, a variety of causes have conspired; nor could we have been thus affected by one or two.

But, upon a strict and just inquiry, you will find it principally owing to those orators, who study rather to gain your favor than to advance your interests. Some of whom (attentive only to the means of establishing their own reputation and power) never extend their thoughts beyond the present moment, and therefore think that your views are equally confined. Others, by their accusations and invectives against those at the head of affairs, labor only to make the state inflict severity upon itself; that, while we are thus engaged, Philip may have full power of speaking and of acting as he pleases. Such are now the usual methods of our statesmen, and hence all our errors and disorders.

Let me entreat you, my countrymen, that if I speak some truths with boldness, I may not be exposed to your resentment. Consider this: on other occasions, you account liberty of speech so general a privilege of all within your walls that aliens and slaves *(1) are allowed to share it. So that many domestics may be found among you, speaking their thoughts with less reserve than citizens in some other states. But from your councils you have utterly banished it. And the consequence is this: in your assemblies, as you listen only to be pleased, you meet with flattery and indulgence: in the circumstances of public affairs, you find yourselves threatened with extremity of danger. If you have still the same dispositions, I must be silent: if you will attend to your true interests, without expecting to be flattered, I am ready to speak. For although our affairs are wretchedly situated, though our inactivity hath occasioned many losses, yet by proper vigor and resolution you may still repair them all. What I am now going to advance may possibly appear incredible; yet it is a certain truth. The greatest of all our past misfortunes is a circumstance the most favorable to our future expectations. And what is this? That the present difficulties are really owing to our utter disregard of everything which in any degree affected our interests: for were we thus situated, in spite of every effort which our duty demanded, then we should regard our fortune as absolutely desperate. But now Philip hath conquered your supineness and inactivity: the state he hath not conquered. Nor have you been defeated; your force hath not even been exerted.

Were it generally acknowledged that Philip was at war with the state, and had really violated the peace, the only point to be considered would then be how to oppose him with the greatest ease and safety. But since there are persons so strangely infatuated, that although he be still extending his conquests, although he hath possessed himself of a considerable part of our dominions, although all mankind have suffered by his injustice, they can yet hear it repeated in this assembly, that it is some of us who are embroiling the state in war. This suggestion must first be guarded against; else there is reason to apprehend that the man who moves you to oppose your adversary may incur the censure of being the author of the war.
And, first of all, I lay down this as certain: if it were in our power to determine whether we should be at peace or war; if peace (that I may begin with this) were wholly dependent upon the option of the state, there is no doubt but we should embrace it. And I expect, that he who asserts it is, will, without attempting to prevaricate, draw up his decree in form, and propose it to your acceptance. But if the other party had drawn the sword, and gathered his armies round him; if he amuse us with the name of peace, while he really proceeds to all kinds of hostilities; what remains but to oppose him? To make professions of peace, indeed, like him;—if this be agreeable to you, I acquiesce. But if any man takes that for peace, which is enabling him, after all his other conquests, to lead his forces hither, his mind must be disordered: at least, it is our conduct only towards him, not his towards us, that must be called a peace. But this it is for which all Philip’s treasures are expended; that he should carry on the war against you, but that you should make no war on him.—Should we continue thus inactive, till he declares himself our enemy, we should be the weakest of mortals. This he would not do, although he were in the heart of Attica, even at the Piraeus, if we may judge from his behavior to others. For it was not till he came within a few miles *(2) of Olynthus that he declared that “either the Olynthians must quit their city, or he his kingdom.” Had he been accused of this at any time before, he would have resented it, and ambassadors must have been despatched to justify their master. In like manner, while he was moving towards the Phocians, he still affected to regard them as allies and friends; nay, there were actually ambassadors from Phocis who attended him in his march; and among us were many who insisted that this march portended no good to Thebes. Not long since, when he went into Thessaly, with all the appearance of amity, he; possessed himself of Pherae. And it is but now he told the wretched people of Oreum, that he had, in all affection, sent some forces to inspect their affairs: for that he heard they labored under disorders and seditions; and that true friends and allies should not be absent upon such occasions.

And can you imagine that he who chose to make use of artifice rather than open force, against enemies by no means able to distress him, who at most could but have defended themselves against him; that he will openly proclaim his hostile designs against you; and this when you yourselves obstinately shut your eyes against them? Impossible! He would be the absurdest of mankind, if, while his outrages pass unnoticed, while you are wholly engaged in accusing some among yourselves, and endeavoring to bring them to a trial, he should put an end to your private contests, warn you to direct all your zeal against him, and so deprive his pensioners of their most specious pretence for suspending your resolutions, that of his not being at war with the state. Heavens! is there any man of a right mind who would judge of peace or war by words, and not by actions? Surely, no man.

To examine then the actions of Philip. When the peace was just concluded, before ever Diopithes had received his commission, or those in the Chersonesus had been sent out, he possessed himself of Serrium and Doriscum, and obliged the forces our general had stationed in the citadel of Serrium and the Sacred Mount to evacuate these places. From these proceedings, what are we to judge of him? The peace he had ratified by the most solemn oaths. And let it not be asked, *(3) of what moment is all this? or how is the state affected by it? Whether these things be of no moment, or whether we are affected by them or no, is a question of another nature. Let the instance of violation be great or small, the sacred obligation of faith and justice is, in all instances, the same.

But farther: when he sends his forces into the Chersonesus, which the king, which every state of Greece acknowledged to be ours; when he confessedly assists our enemies, and braves us with such letters, what are his intentions? for they say he is not at war with us. For my own part, so far am I from acknowledging such conduct to be consistent with his treaty, that I declare that by his attack of the Megareans, by his attempts upon the liberty
of Euboea, by his late incursion into Thrace, by his practices in Peloponnesus, and by
his constant recourse to the power of arms, in all his transactions, he has violated the
treaty, and is at war with you; unless you will affirm that he who prepares to invest a
city is still at peace until the walls be actually assaulted. You cannot, surely, affirm it!
He whose designs, whose whole conduct, tends to reduce me to subjection, that man is
at war with me, though not a blow hath yet been given, not one weapon drawn.

And if any accident should happen, to what dangers must you be exposed! The
Hellespont will be no longer yours; your enemy will become master of Megara and
Euboea: the Peloponnesians will be gained over to his interest. And shall I say that the
man who is thus raising his engines, preparing to storm the city, that he is at peace with
you? No: from that day in which Phocis fell beneath his arms, I date his hostilities
against you. If you will instantly oppose him, I pronounce you wise; if you delay, it will
not be in your power when you are inclined. And so far, Athenians! do I differ from
some other speakers that I think it now no time to debate about the Chersonesus or
Byzantium; but that we should immediately send reinforcements, and guard these places
from all accidents, supply the generals stationed there with everything they stand in need
of, and extend our care to all the Greeks, now in the greatest and most imminent danger.

Let me intreat your attention, while I explain the reasons which induce me to be
apprehensive of this danger; that if they are just, you may adopt them, and be provident
of your own interests at least, if those of others do not affect you: or if they appear
frivolous and impertinent, you may now, and ever hereafter, neglect me as a man of an
unsound mind.

That Philip, from a mean and inconsiderable origin, hath advanced to greatness; that
suspicion and faction divide all the Greeks; that it is more to be admired that he should
become so powerful from what he was, than that now, after such accessions of strength,
he should accomplish all his ambitious schemes: these, and other like points which
might be dwelt upon, I choose to pass over. But there is one concession, which, by the
influence of your example, all men have made to him, which hath heretofore been the
cause of all the Grecian wars. And what is this? an absolute power to act as he pleases,
thus to harass and plunder every state of Greece successively, to invade and to enslave
their cities. You held the sovereignty of Greece seventy-three years: *(4) the
Lacedaemonians commanded for the space of twenty-nine years: *(5) and in these latter
times, after the battle of Leuctra, the Thebans were in some degree of eminence. Yet
neither to you, nor to the Thebans, nor to the Lacedaemonians, did the Greeks ever grant
this uncontrolled power: far from it. On the contrary, when you, or rather the Athenians
of that age, seemed to treat some persons not with due moderation, it was universally
resolved to take up arms; even they who had no private complaints espoused the cause
of the injured. And when the Lacedaemonians succeeded to your power, the moment that
they attempted to enlarge their sway, and to make such changes in affairs as betrayed
their ambitious designs, they were opposed by all, even by those who were not
immediately affected by their conduct. But why do I speak of others? we ourselves and
the Lacedaemonians, though from the first we could allege no injuries against each
other, yet, to redress the injured, thought ourselves bound to draw the sword. And all the
faults of the Lacedaemonians in their thirty years, and of our ancestors in their seventy
years, do not amount to the outrages which Philip hath committed against the Greeks,
within less than thirteen years of power; *(6) or, rather, do not all make up the smallest
part of them. This I shall easily prove in a few words.

Olynthus, and Methone, and Apollonia, and the two-and-thirty cities of Thrace, I pass
all over; every one of which felt such severe effects of his cruelty, that an observer could
not easily determine whether any of them had ever been inhabited or no. The destruction
of the Phocians, a people so considerable, shall also pass unnoticed. But think on the
condition of the Thessalians. Hath he not subverted their states and cities? hath he not
established his tetrarchs over them; that not only single towns, but whole countries, *(7)
might pay him vassalage? are not the states of Euboea in the hands of tyrants, and this in
an island bordering on Thebes and Athens? are not these the express words of his
letters, “they who are willing to obey me may expect peace from me”? And he not only
writes but confirms his menaces by actions. He marches directly to the Hellespont; but
just before he attacked Ambracia; Elis, *(8) one of the chief cities of Peloponnesus, is in
his possession; not long since, he entertained designs against Megara. All Greece, all
the barbarian world, is too narrow for this man’s ambition. And though we Greeks see
and hear all this, we send no embassies to each other, we express no resentment: but
into such wretchedness are we sunk (blocked up within our several cities) that even to
this day we have not been able to perform the least part of that which our interest or our
duty demanded; to engage in any associations, or to form any confederacies; but look
with unconcern upon this man’s growing power, each fondly imagining (as far as I can
judge) that the time in which another is destroyed is gained to him, without ever
consulting or acting for the cause of Greece; although no man can be ignorant, that, like
the regular periodic return of a fever, or other disorder, he is coming upon those who
think themselves most remote from danger.

You are also sensible, that whatever injuries the Greeks suffered by the
Lacedaemonians, or by us, they suffered by the true sons of Greece. And one may
consider it in this light. Suppose a lawful heir, born to an affluence of fortune, should, in
some instances, be guilty of misconduct; he indeed lies open to the justest censure and
reproach; yet it cannot be said that he hath lavished a fortune to which he had no claim,
no right of inheritance. But should a slave, should a pretended son, waste those
possessions which really belonged to others, how much more heinous would it be
thought! how much more worthy of resentment! And shall not Philip and his actions
raise the like indignation? he, who is not only no Greek, no way allied to Greece, but
sprung from a part of the barbarian world unworthy to be named; a vile Macedonian!
where formerly we could not find a slave fit to purchase! And hath his insolence known
any bounds? Besides the destruction of cities, doth he not appoint the Pythian games,
*(9) the common entertainment of Greece; and, if absent himself, send his slaves to
preside? Is he not master of Thermopylae? Are not the passes into Greece possessed by
his guards and mercenaries? Hath he not assumed the honors of the temple, *(10) in
opposition to our claim, to that of the Thessalians, that of the Dorians, and of the other
Amphictyons; honors to which even the Greeks do not pretend? Doth he not prescribe to
the Thessalians, how they shall be governed? Doth he not send out his forces, some to
Porthmus, to expel the Eretrian colony: some to Oreum, to make Phileistides tyrant? And
yet the Greeks see all this without the least impatience.

Just as at the fall of hail; everyone prays it may not alight on his ground, but no one
attempts to fend himself against it: so they not only suffer the general wrongs of Greece
to pass unpunished, but carry their insensibility to the utmost, and are not roused even
by their private wrongs. Hath he not attacked Ambracia and Leucas, cities of the
Corinthians? Hath he not wrested Naupactus from the Achaean *(11) and engaged by
oath to deliver it to the Aetolians? Hath he not robbed the Thebans of Echinus? *(12) Is
he not on his march against the Byzantines? *(13) And are they not our allies? I shall
only add that Cardia, the chief city of the Chersonesus, is in his possession. Yet these
things do not affect us: we are all languid and irresolute: we watch the motions of those
about us, and regard each other with suspicious eyes; and this, when we are all so
manifestly injured. And if he behaves with such insolence towards the general body, to
what extravagances, think ye, will he proceed when master of each particular state? And
now, what is the cause of all this (for there must be some cause, some good reason to be
assigned, why the Greeks were once so jealous of their liberty, and are now ready to submit to slavery? It is this, Athenians! Formerly, men’s minds were animated with that which they now feel no longer, which conquered all the opulence of Persia, maintained the freedom of Greece, and triumphed over the powers of sea and land: but now that it is lost, universal ruin and confusion overspread the face of Greece. What is this? Nothing subtle or mysterious: nothing more than a unanimous abhorrence of all those who accepted bribes from princes, prompted by the ambition of subduing, or the bare intent of corrupting, Greece. To be guilty of such practices was accounted a crime of the blackest kind; a crime which called for all the severity of public justice: no petitioning for mercy, no pardon was allowed. So that neither orator nor general could sell those favorable conjunctures, with which fortune oftentimes assists the supine against the vigilant, and renders men, utterly regardless of their interests, superior to those who exert their utmost efforts: nor were mutual confidence among ourselves, distrust of tyrants and barbarians, and such like noble principles, subject to the power of gold. But now are all these exposed to sale, as in a public mart; and, in exchange, such things have been introduced, as have affected the safety, the very vitals, of Greece. What are these? Envy, when a man hath received a bribe; laughter, if he confess it; pardon, if he be convicted; resentment at his being accused; and all the other appendages of corruption. For as to naval power, troops, revenues, and all kinds of preparations, everything that is esteemed the strength of a state, we are now much better, and more amply provided, than formerly: but they have lost all their force, all their efficacy, all their value, by means of these traffickers.

That such is our present state, you yourselves are witnesses, and need not any testimony from me. That our state, in former times, was quite opposite to this, I shall now convince you, not by any arguments of mine, but by a decree of your ancestors, which they inscribed upon a brazen column erected in the citadel; not with a view to their own advantage (they needed no such memorials to inspire them with just sentiments); but that it might descend to you, as an example of the great attention due to such affairs. Here then the inscription: “Let Arthmius *(14) of Zelia, the son of Pythonax, be accounted infamous, and an enemy to the Athenians and their allies, both he and all his race.” Then comes the reason of his sentence: “Because he brought gold from Media into Peloponnesus.” Not to Athens.

This is the decree. And now, in the name of all the gods, reflect on this! think what wisdom, what dignity, appeared in this action of our ancestors! one Arthmius of Zelia, a slave of the King’s (for Zelia is a city of Asia), in obedience to his master, brings gold, not into Athens, but Peloponnesus. This man they declare an enemy to them and their allies, both he and all his race.” Then comes the reason of his sentence: “Because he brought gold from Media into Peloponnesus.” Not to Athens.

Our fathers, therefore, thought themselves bound to extend their care to all Greece: else they must have looked with unconcern at the introduction of bribery into Peloponnesus. But we find they proceeded to such severity against all they could detect in it, as to raise monuments of their crimes. Hence it was (and no wonder) that the Greeks were a terror to the barbarians, not the barbarians to the Greeks. But now it is not so: for you do not show the same spirit, upon such or upon any other occasions. How then do you behave? you need not be informed.
Why should the whole censure fall on you? the conduct of the rest of Greece is no less blamable. It is my opinion, therefore, that the present state of things demands the utmost care, and most salutary counsel. What counsel? Shall I propose it? and will ye not be offended? Read this memorial.

[Here the secretary reads. And the speaker resumes his discourse.]

And here I must take notice of one weak argument made use of, to inspire us with confidence: That Philip is not yet so powerful as the Lacedaemonians once were, who commanded by sea and land, were strengthened by the alliance of the king, *(15) were absolute and uncontrolled; and yet we made a brave stand against them; nor was all their force able to crush our state. In answer to this, I shall observe, that, amidst all the alterations and improvements which have happened in affairs of every kind, nothing hath been more improved than the art of war: for, in the first place, I am informed, that at that time the Lacedaemonians, and all the other Greeks, used to keep the field four or five months, just the convenient season; and having so long continued their invasion, and infested the territories of their enemy with their heavy-armed and domestic forces, they retired into their own country. Then, such was the simplicity, I should say the national spirit *(16) of that age, that the power of gold was never called to their assistance: but all their wars were fair and open. Now, on the contrary, we see most defeats owing to treachery; no formal engagements, nothing left to the decision of arms. For you find the rapid progress of Philip is not owing to the force of regular troops, but to armies composed of light horse and foreign archers. With these he pours down upon some people, already engaged by civil discord and commotions: and when none will venture out in defence of their state, on account of their private suspicions, he brings up his engines, and attacks their walls. Not to mention his absolute indifference to heat and cold, and that there is no peculiar season which he gives to pleasure. Let these things sink deep into all our minds: let us not suffer his arms to approach these territories: let us not proudly *(17) depend on our strength, by forming our judgments from the old Lacedaemonian war: but let us attend, with all possible precaution, to our interests and our armaments: and let this be our point in view; to confine him to his own kingdom; not to engage him upon equal terms in the field. For, if you be satisfied with committing hostilities, their nature hath given you many advantages. *(18) Let us but do our part. The situation of his kingdom, for instance, exposes it to all the fury of an enemy; not to speak of many other circumstances. But if we once come to a regular engagement, there his experience must give him the superiority.

But these are not the only points that require your attention: nor are you to oppose him only by the arts of war. It is also necessary that reason and penetration should inspire you with an abhorrence of those who plead his cause before you: ever bearing in mind the absolute impossibility of conquering our foreign enemy, until we have punished those who are serving him within our walls. But this, I call the powers of heaven to witness, ye cannot, ye will not do! No: such is your infatuation, or madness, or- I know not what to call it (for I am oftentimes tempted to believe, that some power, more than human, is driving us to ruin), that through malice, or envy, or a spirit of ridicule, or some like motive, you command hirelings to speak (some of whom dare not deny that they are hirelings) and make their calumnies serve your mirth. Yet, shocking as this is, there is something still more shocking: these men are allowed to direct the public affairs with greater security than your faithful counsellors. And now observe the dreadful consequences of listening to such wretches. I shall mention facts well known to you all.

In Olynthus, the administration of affairs was divided between two parties.
The one, in the interest of Philip, entirely devoted to him; the other, inspired by true patriotism, directed all their efforts to preserve the freedom of their country.

To which of those are we to charge the ruin of the state? or who betrayed the troops, and by that treachery destroyed Olynthus? The creatures of Philip. Yet while their city stood these men pursued the advocates for liberty with such malicious accusations and invectives that an assembly of the people was persuaded even to banish Apollonides.

But this is not the only instance. The same custom hath produced the same calamities in other places. In Eretria, at the departure of Plutarchus and the foreign troops, when the people had possession of the city and of Porthmus, some were inclined to seek our protection; some to submit to Philip. But being influenced by this latter party, on most, or, rather, all occasions, the poor unfortunate Eretrians were at length persuaded to banish their faithful counsellors. And the consequence was this: Philip, their confederate and friend, detached a thousand mercenaries under the command of Hipponicus, raised the fortifications of Porthmus, set three tyrants over them, Hipparchus, Automedon, and Clitarchus; and after that, when they discovered some inclination to shake off the yoke, drove them twice out of their territory; once by the forces commanded by Eurylochus; and again, by those under Parmenio.

To give but one instance more. In Oreum, Philistides was the agent of Philip; as were Menippus and Socrates, and Thoas, and Agapaeus, the present masters of that city. And this was universally known. But there was one Euphraeus, a man for some time resident at Athens, who stood up against captivity and slavery.

Much might be said of the injurious and contemptuous treatment which he received from the people of Oreum, upon other occasions. But the year before the taking of the city, as he saw through the traitorous designs of Philistides and his accomplices, he brought a formal impeachment against them. Immediately considerable numbers form themselves into a faction (directed and supported by Philip) and hurry away Euphraeus to prison, as a disturber of the public peace. The people of Oreum were witness of this; but, instead of defending him, and bringing his enemies to condign punishment, showed no resentment towards them; but approved, and triumphed in his sufferings. And now the faction, possessed of all the power they wished for, laid their schemes for the ruin of the city, and were carrying them into execution. Among the people, if any man perceived this, he was silent; struck with the remembrance of Euphraeus and his sufferings. And to such dejection were they reduced, that no one dared to express the least apprehension of the approaching danger, until the enemy drew up before their walls, and prepared for an assault. Then some defended, others betrayed, their state. When the city had thus been shamefully and basely lost, the faction began to exercise the most tyrannic power, having, either by banishment or death, removed all those who had deserted their own cause, and that of Euphraeus; and were still ready for any noble enterprise. Euphraeus himself put an end to his own life: and thus gave proof, that, in his opposition to Philip, he had been actuated by a just and pure regard to the interest of his country.

And now what could be the reason (you may possibly ask with surprise) that the people of Olynthus, and those of Eretria, and those of Oreum, all attended with greater pleasure to the advocates of Philip than to their own friends? The same reason which prevails here. Because they, who are engaged on the part of truth and justice, can never, even if they were inclined, advance anything to recommend themselves to favor; their whole concern is for the welfare of the state.

The others need but to soothe and flatter, in order to second the designs of Philip.
The one press for supplies; the others insist that they are not wanted: the one call their
countrymen to battle, and alarm them with apprehensions of danger; the others are ever
recommending peace, until the toils come too near to be escaped.

And thus, on all occasions, one set of men speak but to insinuate themselves into the
affections of their fellow-citizens; the other to preserve them from ruin: till, at last, the
interests of the state are given up; not corruptly or ignorantly, but from a desperate
purpose of yielding to the fate of a constitution thought to be irrecoverably lost. And, by
the powers of heaven! I dread that this may prove your case; when you find that
reflection cannot serve you! And when I turn my eyes to the men who have reduced you
to this, it is not terror that I feel; it is the utmost detestation. For, whether they act
through design or ignorance, the distress to which they are reducing us is manifest. But
far be this distress from us, Athenians! It were better to die ten thousand deaths, than to
be guilty of a servile complaisance to Philip, and to abandon any of your faithful
counsellors! The people of Oreum have now met a noble return for their confidence in
Philip’s creatures, and their violence towards Euphraeus. The Eretrians are nobly
rewarded for driving out our ambassadors, and committing their affairs to Clitarchus.
Captorvity, and stripes, and racks are their reward. Great was his indulgence to the
Olynthians, for choosing Lasthenes their general, and banishing Apollonides. It were
folly and baseness to be amused with such false hopes as theirs, when neither our
counsels direct us, nor our inclinations prompt us, to the pursuit of our true interests;
and to suffer those who speak for our enemies to persuade us that the state is too
powerful to be affected by any accident whatever. It is shameful to cry out, when some
event hath surprised us, “Heavens! who could have expected this? We should have acted
thus and thus; and avoided these and these errors.” There are many things the
Olynthians can now mention, which, if foreseen in time, would have prevented their
destruction. The people of Oreum can mention many: those of Phocis many: every state
that hath been destroyed can mention many such things. But what doth it avail them
now? While the vessel is safe, whether it be great or small, the mariner, the pilot, every
person should exert himself in his particular station, and preserve it from being wrecked,
either by villany or unskilfulness. But when the sea hath once broken in, all care is vain.
And therefore, Athenians! While we are yet safe, possessed of a powerful city, favored
with many resources, our reputation illustrious- what are we to do? (Perhaps some have
sat with impatience to ask.) I shall now give my opinion, and propose it in form; that, if
approved, your voices may confirm it.

Having, in the first place, provided for your defence, fitted out your navy, raised your
supplies, and arrayed your forces (for although all other people should submit to
slavery, you should still contend for freedom); having made such a provision (I say) and
this in the sight of Greece, then we are to call others to their duty; and, for this purpose,
to send ambassadors into all parts, to Peloponnesus, to Rhodes, to Chios, and even to
the king (for he is by no means unconcerned in opposing the rapidity of this man’s
progress). If ye prevail, ye will have sharers in the dangers and expense which may
arise; at least you may gain some respite: and as we are engaged against a single person,
and not the united powers of a commonwealth, this may be of advantage; as were those
embassies of last year into Peloponnesus, and those remonstrances which were made in
several places by me, and Polydatus, that true patriot, and Hegesippus, and
Clitomachus, and Lycurgus, and the other ministers; which checked his progress,
prevented his attack of Ambracia, and secured Peloponnesus from an invasion.

I do not mean that we should endeavor to raise that spirit abroad, which we ourselves
are unwilling to assume. It would be absurd to neglect our own interests, and yet pretend
a regard to the common cause; or, while we are insensible to present dangers, to think of
alarming others with apprehensions of futurity. No: let us provide the forces in the
Chersonesus with money, and everything else that they desire. Let us begin with vigor on our part: then call upon the other Greeks; convene, instruct, exhort them. Thus it becomes a state of such dignity as ours. If you think the protection of Greece may be entrusted to the Chalcidians and Megaraeans, and so desert its cause, you do not think justly. It will be well if they can protect themselves. No: this is your province; this is that prerogative transmitted from your ancestors, the reward of all their many, and glorious, and great dangers. If every man sits down in ease and indulgence, and studies only to avoid trouble, he will certainly find no one to supply his place; and I am also apprehensive that we may be forced into all that trouble to which we are so averse. Were there persons to act in our stead, our inactivity would have long since discovered them: but there are really none.

You have now heard my sentiments. You have heard the measures I propose, and by which I apprehend our affairs may be yet retrieved. If any man can offer some more salutary course, let him arise, and declare his opinion. And whatever be your resolution, the gods grant that we may feel its good effects!
NOTES

To the Third Philippic *(1) The Athenians piqued themselves on being the most independent and most humane of all people. With them a stranger had liberty of speaking as he pleased, provided he let nothing escape him against the government. So far were they from admitting him into their public deliberations, that a citizen was not permitted to touch on state affairs in the presence of an alien. Their slaves enjoyed a proportionable degree of indulgence. The Saturnalia, when they were allowed to assume the character of masters, was originally an Athenian institution, and adopted at Rome by Numa. At Sparta and Thessaly, on the contrary, slaves were treated with such severity, as obliged them frequently to revolt. The humanity of Athens had its reward: for their slaves did them considerable service on several occasions; at Marathon, in the war of Egina, and at Arginusae.

*(2) In the original, forty stadia, about five miles.

*(3) The partisans of Philip affected to speak with contempt of these places.

To deny the right of Athens to them was dangerous and unpopular; they therefore endeavored to represent them as beneath the public regard.

*(4) See Note 16, Second Olynthiac Oration.

*(5) That is, from the destruction of Athens by Lysander, in the last year of the ninety-third Olympiad, to the first war in which the Athenians, when re-established by Conon, engaged against Sparta, to free themselves and the other Greeks from the Spartan yoke in the last year of the one hundredth Olympiad.

*(6) Philip had now reigned nineteen years. But being at first engaged in wars with his neighbors, he did not begin to make any considerable figure in Greece until the eighth year of his reign; when, after the taking of Methone, he expelled the tyrants of Thessaly, and cut off the Phocian army commanded by Onomarchus.

From this period Demosthenes begins his computation.

*(7) The word in the original signifies a number of different people dependent on one principal state or city.

*(8) He made himself master of this place by treaty, not by force of arms. Elis entered into the league of the amphictyons, by which Philip was acknowledged as their chief; and maintained its freedom till after the death of Alexander.

*(9) To this honor he was admitted by being made an Amphictyon, and declared head of the sacred league. By his slaves we are to understand no more than his subjects: for those old republicans affected to speak thus of the subjects of every king or tyrant.

*(10) Promanteian, the right of precedency in consulting the oracle of Delphos. This the Phocians had enjoyed, as being in possession of the temple; and Philip was invested with it as well as their other privileges. It was thought of considerable consequence by the Greeks, as appears from the first article of a peace made between the Athenians and the allies of Lacedaemon.

*(11) Naupactus was not a city of the Achaeans, but of the Locri Ozolae. Possibly Demosthenes speaks with the liberty of an orator, and found his assertion on some
alliance which Naupactus might have had with the Achaeans against the Aetolians, its
inveterate enemies. This city, thus delivered up, remained ever after under the
jurisdiction of Aetolia, and is mentioned by Livy and Polybius as the principal city of
that country.

*(12) There were two places of this name; the one in Acarnania, the other, which is here
spoken of, founded by the Thebans on the Maliac Gulf.

*(13) He had threatened them already, but had not as yet executed his threats: for we
learn from history that Philip, having for a considerable time besieged Perinthus, raised
the siege in order to march to that of Byzantium. If the siege of Perinthus had preceded
this oration, Demosthenes could not have forgotten so memorable an expedition in
recounting the enterprises of Philip. Probably this prince made a feint of marching to
Byzantium in order to conceal his designs against Perinthus.

*(14) This, in a few words, was the occasion of publishing this terrible decree against
Arthmius, of which Themistocles was the author. Egypt had thrown off the yoke of
Artaxerxes Longimanus. A formidable army marched to reduce the rebels; but failed of
success, as Athens had provided for their defence. The resentment of Artaxerxes then
turned against the Athenians. He sent Megabyzus and other secret agents into
Peloponnesus, to raise up enemies against them by the force of bribery, and to blow up
the flame of resentment and jealousy in Sparta, which was ever ready to break out. But
the attempt was ineffectual. Arthmius, probably, was one of the king of Persia’s agents
in this affair; and Diodorus, who does not name him, includes him, however, in the
general appellation of “the emissaries of Artaxerxes.” *(15) After the expedition into
Sicily, an expedition as unfortunate as it was imprudent, the Athenians might still have
supported themselves, if the king of Persia had not concurred to precipitate their ruin.
Tissaphernes, the satrap of Darius Nothus, conducted the first alliance between his
master and the Lacedaemonians.

This alliance had at that time no very great effect. But when Cyrus the Younger was
sent, by order of his father, to command in Asia Minor, Lysander gained the affection of
this young prince, who soon made him able to give law to Athens. It is this period
which Demosthenes points out.

*(16) Circumstances peculiar to any people, singular customs, particular relations, and
the like, give rise to words and phrases incapable of being precisely rendered into any
other language. And such I take to be the word politikos. Every particular state of
Greece was a member of a larger political body, that of the nation, in which all the
several communities were united by national laws, national customs, and a national
religion. The word politikos is understood as expressive of that duty which each state
owed to the Hellenic body, which prescribed bounds and laws to their wars, and forbade
their passions, contests, and animosities against each other to break out into any
excesses which might affect the welfare of the nation. They were to fight, not as
inveterate foes, but competitors for power and honor. To recur to bribery in order to
defeat their antagonists was to be guilty of corrupting the morals of what, in an
extensive sense, may be called their country. In like manner, the word civilis, in Latin, is
used in a sense somewhat analogous to this, as denoting the regard which every citizen
should pay to the rights of others, in opposition to despotism, pride, imperiousness, and
all those passions which are enemies to liberty and the general good. Thus we find in
Tacittis, “Juveni civile ingenium, mira comitas.”- Ann. i. “Silentium ejus non civile, ut
credi derat, sed in superbiam accipiebatur.”- Ann. vi. And of Tiberius the historian says,
“Liberatus metu, civilem se admodum inter initia, ac paulo minus quam privatum egit.”
And that the extensive social affections were denoted by the Greek word politikon, we
learn from Cicero. Let the following quotation, from the fifth book his treatise “De
Finibus,” suffice on this occasion: “Cum sic hominis natura generata sit, ut habeat quiddam innatum quasi civile et populare, quod Graeci politikon vocant, quicquid aget quaeque virtus, id a communitate, et ea quam exposui caritate, atque societate humana, non abhorrebit.” The authority of a writer who devoted so much of his attention to the moral and political learning of the Greeks, and took so much pains to explain it to his countrymen, may surely be deemed decisive.

*(17) In the original, ektrachelisthenai, which, besides the signification which Wolfius assigns it, is frequently rendered insolescere, superbire.

*(18) Although the Athenians had lost Amphipolis, Pydna, and Potidaea, they were still in possession of Thassus, Lemnos, and the adjacent islands, from whence they might readily have attempted a descent on Macedon.

*(19) The word in the original signifies the most abject fear and dismay; and the whole passage seems to have a particular reference or allusion. Possibly some of Philip’s partisans might have accused Demosthenes of being thus affected at their sight; while they magnified their own integrity and resolution, their true discernment, and patriotic zeal for the interest of their country; and possibly might have called out for severe punishment on the man who dared to utter the most bitter invectives against a powerful prince in alliance with Athens.

THE END OF THE THIRD PHILIPPIC